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Abstract: There is a critical research gap regarding the trade and animal welfare interface: we 
do not know, empirically, what the impact of trade on animal welfare is. This gap exists, in 
part, due to the paternalism of international trade law and the underdevelopment of global 
animal law. Firstly, this article addresses the tense collision of dichotomous trade and animal 
welfare priorities in legal and political systems. Secondly, this article explores attempts at 
reconciliation by the World Trade Organization and the European Union. This involves an 
investigation of the empirical impact of trade on animal welfare. This impact is categorised 
into four component parts: (1) open markets, (2) low animal welfare havens, (3) chilling effect, 
and (4) lack of labelling. Case studies from the European Union are utilised. Thirdly, this article 
critiques trade law and policy as ill-suited primary drivers of global governance for animals. 
Global animal law is identified as a promising alternative, though its early development has 
been unduly impacted by international trade law. 
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To genuinely engage with a new frontier of justice, for animals or otherwise, requires what bell hooks calls a 
"radical openness” of mind, of being able to receive new, different, and challenging ideas from a space of 
learning, teaching, and humility.1 
The frontier of justice for animals is in great need of radical openness to address the impact of 
trade law and policy on animal welfare. Instead of demonstrating radical openness, trade law 
and policy is paternalistic toward animals. This means it propagates law about animals rather 
than law for animals. It fails to respect and reflect animals’ senses of what is in their best 
interest.2 Trade law’s paternalism partly stems from the disparity between liberal trade 
ideology and the normative and ethical underpinnings of the animal liberation movement. 
Trade law’s paternalism also results from the failure of global animal law to establish itself as 
an effective counter-discourse: it has been deeply infiltrated by trade law’s linkage debate. 
Radical openness is increasingly lacking amongst commentators to the trade and animal 
welfare interface. Thus, a critical gap in the research remains: we do not know, empirically, 
what the impact of trade on animal welfare is. Researchers are increasingly complacent 
regarding the heavy hand of international trade law in global governance for animals. They are 
not asking fundamental empirical and critical questions regarding the impact of trade. 
Therefore, insufficient critique is launched against policymakers in Europe who prove 
consistently comfortable with prioritizing trade objectives over animal welfare protection. A 
radical openness is needed which can be facilitated by transplanting the trade and animal 
welfare debate from the fringes of the trade linkage debate to the core of the emerging academic 
discourse on global animal law.3 
 
1 M. Deckha, ‘Animal Justice, Cultural Justice: A Posthumanist Response to Cultural Rights in Animals’ (2007) 
2 Journal of Animal Law & Ethics, pp. 189-230, at 198, citing B. Hooks, Teaching Community: A Pedagogy of 
Hope (Routledge, 2003), p. 48. 
2 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, 2004), pp. 104-5. 
3 A. Peters, ‘Global Animal Law: What It Is and Why We Need It’ (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, 
pp. 9-23, at 17; and A. Peters, ‘Liberté, Égalité, Animalité: Human-Animal Comparisons in Law’ (2016) 5(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 25-53. 
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This article addresses the paternalism of trade law and policy towards animals in three 
parts. Firstly, it sets out the tense collision between dichotomous trade and animal welfare 
priorities in legal and political systems. This involves an analysis of the linkage debate and the 
effects of normative divergence between trade liberators and animal liberators. 
Secondly, this article elucidates the roles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the European Union (EU) in structuring attempts toward the reconciliation of these competing 
objectives. This section uses empirical research to reveal the continued dominance of trade in 
European policymaking and its negative impact on animal welfare. Although the impact of 
trade on animal welfare has amassed some attention from academics and practitioners,4 the 
existing literature typically speculates about potential impacts of trade upon animal welfare 
without investigating this quantitatively.5 This article fills a crucial research gap and identifies 
four component parts to the impact of trade on animal welfare. 
Thirdly, this article reflects on the dominance of trade objectives by critically analyzing 
the role of trade law and policy as a central driver of global animal law.  It situates itself within 
the global animal law academic space whilst also critiquing that discourse for its complacency 
regarding and adoption of trade-centric presumptions and practices. This section concludes that 
research on the impact of trade has been restricted by the force of trade law and its associated 
research tradition, and that precise empirical research is difficult to conduct because of 
 
4 C. Fisher, ‘Getting Animal Welfare on to the World Trade Agenda’, in R.H. Pedler (ed.), European Union 
Lobbying: Changes in the Arena (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 155-75; R. Howse & J. Langille, ‘Permitting 
Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by 
Noninstrumental Moral Values’ (2011) 37(2) Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 367-432; and K. Sykes, 
‘Sealing Animal Welfare into the GATT Exceptions: The International Dimension of Animal Welfare in WTO 
Disputes’ (2014) 13(3) World Trade Review, pp. 471-98. 
5 E.g., L. Bollard, ‘Global Approaches to Regulating Farm Animal Welfare’, in G. Steier & K. Patel (eds), 
International Farm Animal, Wildlife and Food Safety Law (Springer, 2017), pp. 83-109, at 99; A. Lurie & M. 
Kalinina, ‘Protecting Animals in International Trade: A Study of the Recent Successes at the WTO and in Free 
Trade Agreements’ (2015) 30(3) American University International Law Review, pp. 431-87, at 433; and Peters, 
‘Global Animal Law’, n. 3 above, p. 17. For a rare exception, see: E. Strader, ‘The Future of Horse Slaughter: 
What Is Best’ (2013) 15(2) Oregon Review of International Law, pp. 293-314. 
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limitations in the trade data, owing to the paternalism inherent in trade policy practices. This 
article aims to inspire radically open research on the impact of trade on animal welfare. 
 
2. TENSIONS AND COLLIDING PRIORITIES IN TRADE AND ANIMAL 
WELFARE 
   
2.1 Trade and Animals: Bridging the Dichotomy 
 
The practice of trading animals and their products has a deep-rooted history beginning with the 
export of wool from Crete to Egypt in 2000 to 1500 BC.6 Animal trade has significantly 
benefited humankind, enabling us to evolve from hunter-gatherers to settled agriculturalists.7 
However, just like animal agriculture, the exploitative dynamic of animal trade has evolved 
through periods of war, colonization, and industrialization, becoming increasingly harmful 
over time.8 Ancient donkey-trodden trading routes are now found buried beneath modern road 
infrastructure or serve as hiking trails. The modern vision of trade in animal products is, 
instead, one of shipping containers filled with leather or seal skin, refrigerated trucks 
transporting chilled meat cuts, and lorries carrying live animals across borders to slaughter. 
Trade in intensively farmed meat, dairy and fish is particularly troubling due to its 
volume and the suffering it forces upon animals.9 Live sheep shipped for slaughter from 
Australia to Southeast Asia and the middle east regularly perish from heat stress.10 Scottish 
salmon exports reached a record high in 201811 despite recent reports on the industry’s negative 
 
6 C.J.C. Phillips, The Animal Trade: Evolution, Ethics and Implications (CABI Publishing, 2015), p. 2. 
7 Ibid, p. 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 R. Harrison, Animal Machines: The New Factory Farming Industry (Vincent Stuart Publishers Ltd, 1964). 
10 C. Wahlquist, ‘RSPCA Accusses Government of Backflip on Welfare for Live Exports from Australia’, The 
Guardian, 28 Sept. 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/28/rspca-accuses-
government-of-backflip-on-welfare-for-live-exports-from-australia. 




impacts on animal welfare.12 Ukraine has developed a battery cage egg industry for export to 
the EU, undermining the objectives of the EU’s domestic ban on battery cage egg farming.13 
Trading animals and their products is inherently exploitative in that it treats animals as 
property.14 The practices associated with modern animal trade resemble the western factory 
farming model which is regarded by many animal liberationists as a vampiric, dystopian 
nightmare.15 Despite this, trade in animal products continues to grow. Extra-EU trade in animal 
products almost doubled in the last decade, amounting to over 65 billion euros in 2015 (about 
1.9% of all extra-EU trade).16   
This reveals the overwhelmingly economic objectives of the actors involved and the 
great disparity between the objectives of free trade proponents and animal liberators. Trade in 
animal products occurs, regardless of the impact on animals, because imported products are 
cheaper, of better quality, or more readily available than comparable domestic products.17 This 
is reflective of the liberal ideology upon which international trade is based: it aims at achieving 
economic efficiency so as to improve economic growth for states, incomes for individuals, 
employment rates, and standards of living.18 
 
12 R. Edwards, ‘Horror photos of farmed salmon spark legal threat’, The Ferret, 27 Jun. 2018, available at: 
https://theferret.scot/pictures-diseases-farmed-fish/. 
13 See below at 3.4. 
14 G.L. Francione, Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (Temple University Press, 
1996), pp. 3 et seq. 
15 See storied accounts of animal suffering in P. Singer, Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Man’s Inhumanity 
to Animals (Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1976); Regan, n. 2 above; and J. Safran Foer, Eating Animals (Little, Brown and 
Company, 2009). On the value of emotional response, see J. Donovan & C.J. Adams (eds), The Feminist Care 
Tradition in Animal Ethics (Columbia University Press, 2007). 
16 Data sourced from Eurostat, ‘International trade in goods – detailed data’, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 
17 Most commonly explained by reference to varying opportunity cost, division of labour and specialization as 
posited by David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage: D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation (John Murray, 1817). 
18 P. Van den Bossche & W. Zdouc (eds), The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials, 4th edn. (Cambridge University Press 2017), at ch. 1.2. For the history of liberal and neo-liberal thought, 
see R.S. Turner, ‘The “rebirth of liberalism”: The origins of neo-liberal ideology’ (2007) 12(1) Journal of Political 
Ideologies, pp. 67-83. 
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The liberal values and ideologies underpinning trade in animal products is far removed 
from the posthumanist19, feminist,20 rights-based,21 and welfarist22 ethics that are deployed by 
animal liberationists to promote the protection of animals in society, in policy, and in law. The 
gulf between the two is widest when the animal liberationists are critical researchers and 
abolitionist activists.23 Their ideologies are fundamentally incompatible with the liberal 
ideology that supports animal trade. The gulf narrows in the case of policy-oriented animal 
welfare non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which typically curtail abolitionist leanings 
in order to promote concrete policy changes in the short to medium term.24 
Moderate lawmakers and policy officials working on animal welfare have an even 
greater likelihood of peacefully coexisting with liberal trade ideology. Animal protection in 
law typically relies upon a welfarist balancing act between human and animal interests in order 
to protect animals from unnecessary suffering.25 This is how the EU has attempted to bridge 
the divergence between animal interests and liberal or free trade ideology.26 However, 
generally speaking, free trade has been conceptually separated from and prioritized over so 
called ‘non-trade concerns’ such as animal welfare. 
 
2.2. Prioritizing Free Trade over Trade Impact Concerns 
 
 
19 Donna Haraway is a leader here. See D.J. Haraway, When Species Meet (University of Minnesota Press, 2008); 
and D.J. Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Prickly 
Paradigm Press, 2003) 
20 Donovan and Adams, n. 15 above is central. For a modern intersectional take, see M. Deckha, ‘Toward a 
Postcolonial, Posthumanist Feminist Theory: Centralizing Race and Culture in Feminist Work on Nonhuman 
Animals’ (2012) 27(3) Hypatia, pp. 527-45. 
21 E.g. Regan, n. 2 above; G.L. Francione, Animals as Persons (Columbia University Press, 2008); S.M. Wise, 
Rattling the cage: towards legal rights for animals (Profile, 2000). 
22 Singer, n. 15 above is central. For modern commentary, see S.P. McCulloch, ‘On the Virtue of Solidarity: 
Animal Rights, Animal Welfarism and Animals’ Rights to Wellbeing’ (2012) Journal of Animal Welfare, pp. 5-
15. 
23 Francione, n. 21 above, p. 150. 
24 E.g., Eurogroup for Animals, ‘Model Animal Welfare Provisions for EU Trade Agreements’, 2017, available 
at: http://www.eurogroupforanimals.org/wp-content/uploads/E4A-MAWP_Report-screen.pdf.  
25 R. Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality, 2nd edn (Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 85-6. 
26 See 3.1 below. 
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The linkage debate is a conceptual battleground where the notion of free (or liberal) trade 
(described as the ‘normative justification for the WTO’)27 and the WTO’s treatment of so-
called ‘non-trade concerns’ (primarily environmental and labour concerns) have been dissected 
and scrutinized. The linkage debate has kept the WTO in check for, at times, providing 
inadequate regulatory autonomy to its members to enact trade restrictive measures aimed at 
environmental protection or safeguarding labour rights.28 
Liberal economic objectives are at the heart of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)29 - enacted in the ‘Bretton Woods’30 era of trade - and of the WTO.31 
Consequently, the restriction of trade in order to protect, for example, animal welfare, goes 
against the substantive trade liberalization rules of the WTO. This dichotomy is perpetuated in 
WTO disputes and in much of the linkage debate literature.32 This section sets out this 
dichotomous thinking before outlining a more critical, nuanced approach. This also justifies 
and frames the empirical research below. 
 In the first US – Tuna case before a GATT panel, a US dolphin-protection measure was 
found to discriminate against Mexican fishing fleets.33 The panel dismissed the US 
conservation objectives, permitting members to pursue ‘full use of the world’s resources’.34 
The GATT panel decision was criticized for failing to give due deference to environmental 
 
27 D.M. Driesen, ‘What is Free Trade? The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2001) 
41(2) Virginia Journal of International Law, pp. 279-368, at 284. 
28 For an overview, see M. Gonzalez-Garibay, ‘The Trade-Labour and Trade-Environment Linkages: Together or 
Apart?’ (2011) 10(2) Journal of International Trade Law & Policy, pp. 165-84. 
29 Geneva (Switzerland), 30 Oct. 1947, in force 1 Jan. 1948, available at: http://docsonline.wto.org. 
30 The Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944 constituted an important post-war effort to rebuild the international 
economic system. 
31 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in 
force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: http://docsonline.wto.org, at Preamble, Recital 3. 
32 E.g., references to separate ‘realms’ in D.C. Esty, ‘Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide’ (2001) 15(3) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 113-30, at 126. 
33 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS21, unadopted, 3 Sept. 
1991. 
34 C.J. Archibald, ‘Forbidden by the WTO? Discrimination against a Product When its Creation Causes Harm to 
the Environment or Animal Welfare’ (2008) 48(1) Natural Resources Journal, pp. 15-49, at 18. 
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objectives and for classifying environment-protecting trade restrictions as extraterritorial 
measures disallowed by WTO law.35 
 However, over time a gradual shift has occurred. The WTO now shows more deference 
to members’ objectives regarding trade impact concerns, including the environment and animal 
welfare.36 US – Shrimp diverged from the earlier ruling in US – Tuna by stating that 
extraterritorial measures, which condition market access upon the exporting country adopting 
a particular policy, is probably a common feature of measures that fall within the scope of the 
Article XX GATT exceptions.37 Thus, WTO members are not barred per se from restricting 
trade in order to pursue environmental protection. The US – Tuna saga has evolved to permit 
further space for members’ trade restrictions with environmental objectives.38  
Extensive commentary on these disputes will not be repeated here.39 In sum, the WTO 
has come much closer to striking a good balance between liberal free trade objectives and 
issues such as environmental protection.40 However, the evolving application of the WTO rules 
in disputes has revealed the potentially detrimental force of trade law and has given rise to 
concern amongst academics.41 This has led to a critique of dichotomous thinking within the 
linkage debate. 
Critical inquiries require asking what it is that ‘free trade’ is to be free from.42 The 
current trade law regime amalgamates three conceptions of free trade: trade free from 
 
35 S. Harrop & D. Bowles, ‘Wildlife Management, the Multilateral Trade Regime, Morals and the Welfare of 
Animals’ (1998) 1(1) Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, pp. 64-94, at 85-6. 
36 R. Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary’ (2016) 27(1) 
European Journal of International Law, pp. 9-77, at 36-8. 
37 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 Oct. 1998, para. 121. 
38 R. Howse, ‘Last Week’s Tuna II WTO Panel Report: Happy Ending to a Hair-raising Adventure on the High 
Seas’, International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 2 Nov. 2017, available at: 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/11/last-weeks-tuna-ii-wto-panel-reporthappy-ending-to-a-hair-
raising-adventure-on-the-high-seas-.html. 
39 Overview and further references in Van den Bossche and Zdouc, n. 18 above, pp. 544-57. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See particularly on the sprawling US – Tuna saga: C. Coglianese & A. Sapir, ‘Risk and Regulatory Calibration: 
WTO Compliance Review of the US Dolphin–Safe Tuna Labeling Regime’ (2017) 16(2) World Trade Review, 
pp. 327-48, at 336. 
42 Driesen, n. 27 above, p. 300. 
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discrimination;43 trade free from international coercion whereby one state may try to influence 
another to adopt particular policies;44 and trade ‘free of national regulation under a broad 
laissez-faire conception’.45 So called ‘non-trade concerns’ such as animal welfare are regarded 
as exceptions to free trade rather than as encompassed within the scope of free trade.46 This 
conceptual dichotomy lies at the heart of the WTO’s reluctance to legitimize ‘non-trade issues’. 
However, the meaning of free trade is not static or pure.47 Rather, it is a highly 
contextual concept that ‘varies in meaning across time and across political cultures’.48 Law can 
be used to ‘renew and re-imagin[e]’ that concept.49 In this way, developments within global 
animal law could impact upon the normative underpinnings of trade law. 
Unfortunately, contributors to the linkage debate have largely embraced the 
dichotomous thinking introduced above, accepting concerns such as animal welfare to be ‘non-
trade issues’.50 Andrew Lang has pointed out that ‘it is not self-evident, of course, that the 
major international institution presiding over the global trade system has no business 
addressing the social and environmental impacts of that system, and that such impacts are not 
“trade issues”’.51  
It is not an inevitability that ‘free trade’ must exclude animal protection, permitting it 
only as an exception. It is simply that the current system of trade law and policy accepts and 
perpetuates this dichotomous thinking. This is in spite of strong indications that free trade, in 
its current formulation, will fail to remain a democratically viable concept if it continues to 
neglect fundamental ethical dilemmas within and amongst communities regarding the use and 
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, p. 285. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, p. 286. 
47A. Lang, ‘Reflecting on ‘Linkage’: Cognitive and Institutional Change in The International Trading System’ 
(2007) 70(4) Modern Law Review, pp. 523-49. 
48 Ibid, pp. 524-5. 
49 Ibid, p. 547. 
50 E.g. Esty, n. 32 above. 
51 Lang, n. 47 above, p. 537. 
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treatment of animals. This is reflected in the public opposition to the WTO at the Battle in 
Seattle52 and, more recently, in the public backlash to the negotiations for the EU-US 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).53 Indeed, this article rejects the 
presupposition of a conceptual division between ‘non-trade issues’ and trade policy, as well as 
the presupposed economy-centric conception of what EU and WTO trade policy is centrally 
and importantly about. For this reason, the article will refer to issues typically dubbed ‘non-
trade issues’ as ‘trade impact issues’. 
 
3. TRADE LAW AND POLICY TO THE DETRIMENT OF GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE FOR ANIMALS 
 
The significance of trade as a global animal law question is great but should not be overstated. 
Other factors also impact the effectiveness of animal law. These include poor enforcement54 
and lack of political will to fill gaps in animal law.55 Some of these factors impact animal 
welfare in tandem with trade and, thus, make proving causality difficult. However, others partly 
result from the impact of trade, reinforcing arguments for causality. For example, consumer 
awareness is harmed by WTO restrictions on the use of labels. 
Other forms of transnational cooperation also have the potential to impact animal 
welfare. These include the negotiation of non-binding animal welfare standards, multilateral 
environmental agreements and international investment agreements 56 However, only trade can 
 
52 K. Oldham, ‘WTO Meeting and Protests in Seattle (1999) – Part 1’, HistoryLink.org, 13 Oct. 2009, available 
at: http://www.historylink.org/File/9183. 
53 S. Treat & S. Sharma, Selling off the Farm: Corporate Meat’s Takeover through TTIP (Institute for Agriculture 
and Trade Policy, 2016), available at: https://www.ciwf.org.uk/media/7428251/report-sellingoffthefarm-final-
july-2016.pdf. 
54 European Court of Auditors, ‘Special Report: Animal welfare in the EU: closing the gap between ambitious 
goals and practical implementation’, 14 Nov. 2018, available at: 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=47557. 
55 See below at 3.5. 
56 World Organization for Animal Health, ‘Terrestrial Animal Health Code’, 28th edn., 2019, available at: 
https://www.oie.int/standard-setting/terrestrial-code/, s. 7; S. Harrop. ‘Climate Change, Conservation and the 
Place for Wild Animal Welfare in International Law’ (2011) 23(3) Journal of Environmental Law pp. 441-62; 
and Bollard, n. 5 above, p. 95. 
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directly alter citizens’ consumption by permitting new products into their market.57 Trade is 
one of the most challenging ways in which a domestic, ethical, political agenda may be 
threatened by an extra-jurisdictional or transnational force. Thus, the impact of trade law and 
policy on animal welfare must be understood and counteracted if animal protection efforts are 
to be effective. 
 
 
3.1 Roles in Reconciliation  
 
In this regard, it is problematic that WTO law’s rule-exception approach has, for much of the 
WTO’s history, minimized trade impact issues and excluded them from the concept of free 
trade.58 For environmental issues, that balance has shifted through a series of disputes.59 There 
is also reference to sustainable development in the WTO treaty60 and numerous multilateral 
environmental agreements with institutional mechanisms that cooperate with the WTO .61 
Animal issues have neither of these advantages. 
The WTO treaties are silent on the issue of animal welfare.62 Thus there is no basis 
upon which to pursue the harmonization of animal welfare standards through the WTO. Even 
if such grounding did exist, the risk of lowest common denominator results would be high63 
and effective dual-purpose regulation which might, for example, promote the adoption of an 
animal welfare-encompassing free trade policy, tends to be elusive.64  
 
57 This impact is also demonstrated in the nutrition transition: A.M. Thow et al, ‘Trade and the Nutrition 
Transition: Strengthening Policy for Health in the Pacific’ (2011) 50(1) Ecology of Food and Nutrition, pp. 18-
42. 
58 See 2.2 above. 
59 Ibid. 
60 WTO Agreement, n. 31 above, preamble recital 1. 
61 Non-WTO international law can impact interpretations of WTO law: US – Shrimp, n. 37 above, para. 130-2. 
On WTO-MEA cooperation, see G. Marín Durán, ‘The Role of the EU in Shaping the Trade and Environment 
Regulatory Nexus: Multilateral and Regional Approaches’ in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds), 
The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 228-33. 
62 But not, however, on animal health. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: http://docsonline.wto.org, 
63 S. Harrop, ‘The International Regulation of Animal Welfare and Conservation Issues through Standards Dealing 
with the Trapping of Wild Mammals’ (2000) 12(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 333-60, at 360. 
64 S. Kingston, V. Heyvaert & A. Čavoški, European Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017), at 
pp. 449-50 & 488. 
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Animal welfare has been the subject of negative integration through the WTO’s dispute 
settlement body. In the landmark EC – Seal Products case, Norway and Canada challenged the 
EU’s seal regime, which bans the placing on the market of seal products.65 There is moral 
concern regarding these hunts owing to the inhumane suffering sealing often entails.66 The 
Appellate Body ruled that banning trade to protect animal welfare was provisionally justified 
under Article XX(a) GATT as a matter of public morality.67However, the EU’s seal regime 
ultimately failed to comply with the chapeau to Article XX GATT because exceptions to the 
trade ban were found to entail discriminatory treatment.68 The EU implemented the 
recommendation of the WTO dispute settlement body to limit the exceptions to its trade ban, 
thus strengthening the measure’s impact on animal welfare.69 
This case proves the traditional narrative – of the EU as a leader on animal welfare and 
the WTO as its primary obstacle – to be oversimplified.70 Further, the collision of trade and 
animal welfare policy in the EU reveal that the EU hardly acts like the global leader in the legal 
protection of animals which it claims to be.71 
Indeed, the EU’s animal protection efforts are frequently undermined by its own trade 
policy. For example, the EU has vast ambitions with regard to its bilateral trade policy, 
including trade in animal products, but it has poorly implemented its 2008-2015 Animal 
Welfare Strategy.72 The EU made a proposal on animal welfare to the WTO but swiftly 
 
65 Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Trade in Seal Products [2009] 
OJ L 286/36. 
66 Ibid, at para. 4. 
67 European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Panel Report, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, 25 Nov. 2013; European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, 
WT/DS/401/AB/R, 22 May 2014. 
68 EC – Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, ibid, paras 5.337-9. 
69 Dispute Settlement Body, ‘Minutes of Meeting – Held in the Centre William Rappard on 28 October 2015’, 
WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/369, 20 Jan. 2016, para. 144-8. 
70 M. Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 133-7. 
71 P. Fitzgerald, ‘Morality may not be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare meets 
International Trade Law’ (2011) 14(2) Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, pp. 85-136, at 88. 
72 Court of Auditors, n. 54 above. 
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abandoned it following resistance.73 The EU unilaterally restricts trade in some controversial 
animal products like seal or cat and dog fur but it permits and promotes trade in most animal 
products without conditioning this on animal welfare protection.74 The EU now maintains a 
policy to include animal welfare in all bilateral trade agreements but it does so with variable 
success.75 Arguably, the EU’s feeble attempts at integrating animal welfare concerns in its trade 
policy are mere attempts at green-washing, since it effectively continues to liberalize trade in 
animal products and permit harmful industrialized farming practices within its member states.76 
The remainder of this section empirically explores the impact of trade on animal 
welfare in the EU. The following section will show that, on the basis of this analysis, neither 
the EU nor the WTO have succeeded in reconciling these two policy areas in a way that gives 
adequate consideration to animal welfare. However, emerging research on global animal law 
is relatively blind to this shortcoming because of the disproportionately large contribution of 
trade law to the ‘tentative and embryonic’ global governance for animals.77 
 
3.2 Mapping the Impact of Trade 
 
The impact of trade on animal welfare can be broken down into four component parts: (1) open 
markets, (2) low animal welfare havens, (3) a chilling effect, and (4) a lack of labelling. 
 
73 Committee on Agriculture, ‘Special Session – European Communities Proposal: Animal Welfare and Trade in 
Agriculture’, WTO Doc. G/AG/NG/W/19, 28 Jun. 2000. 
74 Regulation 1523/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council banning the placing on the market and 
the import to, or export from, the Community of cat and dog fur, and products containing such fur [2007] OJ 
L343/50; Seals Regulation, n. 66 above. 
75 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council and European Economic and 
Social Committee, ‘European Union Strategy for the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2012-2015’, 
COM/2012/6 final/2, 19 Jan. 2012, p. 10. On implementation, see C. Cabanne, ‘The EU-Chile association 
agreement: A booster for animal welfare’ (2013) 7(1) Bridges Trade & Biological Resources News Digest, 
available at: https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/the-eu-chile-association-agreement-a-booster-for-
animal-welfare. 
76 A useful tool to help visualize industrialized harm is available at: https://vaci.voiceless.org.au.  
77 K. Sykes, ‘Globalisation and the Animal Turn: How International Trade Law Contributes to Global Norms of 
Animal Protection’ (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 55-79, at 57. 
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 The open markets condition allows low welfare imports to enter a liberalized 
marketplace. This marketplace may itself enact more advanced animal welfare rules, but these 
rules do not apply to imported animals and animal products. If production shifts to states with 
poor regulation, low animal welfare havens will arise. This occurs because trade favours cheap, 
‘efficient’ production.78  
There are two forms of chilling effect that may follow, one of which will be investigated 
in this article. Firstly, domestic producers now find themselves in a situation where they must 
comply with high welfare standards, but at the same time they must compete with cheaper, low 
welfare imported products.79 A chilling effect or even a race to the bottom may occur if strained 
domestic producers attempt to regain competitiveness by pressuring governments to halt 
development of, weaken, or abandon domestic welfare standards. There is not enough space to 
tackle this chilling effect in this article. Instead, the focus will be on a second chilling effect: 
the pressure that has been felt by WTO members to refrain from restricting trade in order to 
protect animal welfare, thus facilitating low welfare imports. 
Finally, the lack of effective product labelling for animal welfare ensures that this 
negative cycle will continue.80 Animal welfare labels on the market are ineffective because 
they are voluntary, with poor market capture and low recognisability.81 Requiring labelling of 
imports is potentially compatible with WTO law but has rarely been pursued as part of WTO 
 
78 H. Grethe, ‘High animal welfare standards in the EU and international trade - How to prevent potential “low 
animal welfare havens”?’ (2007) 32(3) Food Policy, pp. 315-33. 
79 P. Stevenson, ‘The World Trade Organisation Rules: A Legal Analysis of their Adverse Impact on Animal 
Welfare’ (2002) 8 Animal Law, pp. 107-42, at 109; P. Thomas, ‘Playing Chicken at the WTO: Defending an 
Animal Welfare-Based Trade Restriction under GATT’s Moral Exception’ (2007) 34(3) Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review, pp. 605-37, at 609. 
80 E.g. Regulation (EC) No. 589/2008 laying down detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1234/2007 as regards marketing standards for eggs [2008] OJ L163, Art. 32. 
81 Food Chain Evaluation Consortium et al, ‘Feasibility study on animal welfare labelling and establishing a 
Community Reference Centre for Animal Protection and Welfare: Part 1: Animal Welfare Labelling: Final 
Report’, 26 Jan. 2009, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/aw_other_aspects_labelling_feasibility_study_report_par
t1.pdf, pp. 14-7; and Farm Sanctuary, ‘The Truth Behind the Labels: Farm Animal Welfare Standards and 
Labelling Practices: A Farm Sanctuary Report’, Apr. 2009. 
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members’ trade policies.82 If consumers who are concerned about animal welfare do not know 
what conditions animals are reared in, they are more likely to unwittingly purchase cheap, low 
welfare products. This constitutes a market failure caused by insufficient availability of 
information. 
 The first three components of impact will be analyzed empirically in the paragraphs 
that follow. The fourth component, the lack of labelling, is well documented and will not be 
analyzed here. 
  
3.3 The First Component: Open Markets 
Three case studies were selected to quantify the problem of low welfare imports and low animal 
welfare havens. These are: the EU-wide bans on the use of battery cages for laying hens, on 
the use of sow stalls, and on the use of veal creates. The three case studies were selected because 
their clear implementation dates facilitate assessments of changes in trade levels, as well as for 
their relevance to animal welfare policy. Close confinement systems impose lifelong suffering 
upon animals. Oppressive cages make most natural behaviours impossible, reducing unique 
sentient creatures to productive automatons. 
 
Laying Hen Battery Cage Ban 
On 1 January 2012, an EU ban on the use of battery cages for laying hens came into force.83 
The directive permits battery caged eggs to be imported from non-EU countries – thus 
prioritizing trade objectives over animal welfare objectives - and it permits the continued use 
of ‘enriched cages’ in the EU.84 
 
82 The present author’s research on this is summarised in Eurogroup for Animals, ‘Policy Brief - Method-of-
Production Labelling: The Way Forward to Sustainable Trade’, 2019, pp. 9-14. 
83 Directive 99/74/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens [1999] OJ L203/53, Art. 
5(2). 
84 Ibid, Art 6. 
16 
 
In 2012, the first year of the ban’s implementation, the EU imported 15,572 tonnes85 of 
egg products (both in-shell and non-shell). Available data does not indicate the production 
method of imported eggs. This masks the impact on animal welfare and supports arguments 
that trade policy is ill-suited as a primary driver of the governance for animals. It is possible, 
for our purposes, to extrapolate estimates based on the methods of production in the exporting 
states. 
 The Unites States (US) accounted for almost half of EU egg imports in 2012. In 2018, 
around 18% of the US laying flock were housed in cage-free systems.86 This is compared to 
44% of EU hens kept in non-cage (‘alternative’) systems.87 The marginal production of cage-
free eggs in the US coupled with the permissibility of exporting caged eggs to the EU would 
suggest that most US exports to the EU are from battery caged hens. 
 Following the US, the EU imported 2,362 tonnes of eggs from Albania, 1,745 tonnes 
from Argentina, 1,541 tonnes from India, and 1,133 tonnes from Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
Compassion in World Farming cites a World Poultry study from 2008 that found 100% of 
Argentinian laying hens and 78% of Indian laying hens were reared in cage systems.88 As 
unenriched battery cages are the global standard in the absence of contrary legislative 
requirements, it is reasonable to assume that the caged systems used in these states are 
unenriched battery cages. 
 
Sow Stall Ban 
Sow stalls house pigs individually, in a restrictive way to protect piglets from suffocation. The 
restrictions in mobility and socialization entail poor welfare and the inhibition of natural 
 
85 Unless otherwise stated, all trade data is sourced from Eurostat, n. 16 above. 
86 ‘Facts and Stats’, United Egg Producers, 2019, available at: https://unitedegg.com/facts-stats/. 
87 European Commission, ‘Eggs – Market Situation - Dashboard’, 13 Nov. 2019, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/eggs-dashboard_en.pdf. 
88 Compassion in World Farming, ‘Statistics: laying hens’, 28 Aug. 2013, available at: 
https://www.ciwf.org.uk/media/5235021/Statistics-Laying-hens.pdf, p. 8. 
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behaviours. The EU imposed a partial ban on the use of sow stalls that came into effect on 1 
January 2013.89 This bans the use of sow stalls except for the first four weeks of pregnancy and 
for one week before farrowing. The directive does not regulate imports. 
 The EU imported 34,487 tonnes of pork in 2013, the first year of the ban’s 
implementation. The majority of these imports come from Switzerland where sow stalls are 
banned completely.90 Thus, the issue of low welfare imports of pork to the EU is not pressing. 
 
Veal Crate Ban 
Veal crates severely restrict the movement of calves by tying their necks (in some cases, for 
their entire lives). The use of veal crates was banned from 31 December 2006 for all calves 
older than eight weeks in EU holdings.91 
In 2007, the first year of the implementation of the veal crate ban, the EU imported 
305,480 tonnes of beef and veal. Amongst the top exporters to the EU are Brazil, Uruguay, 
Argentina, Australia and the US. Veal crates are not used in Australia.92 Industry in the US has 
also moved away from veal crates following a vote of the American Veal Association.93 
However, intensive farming methods such as veal crates are commonly used in the Latin 
American countries that provide the highest number of veal products to the EU.94  
Note, however, that beef and veal are treated as a single category in all the readily 
available trade statistics. This practice disregards and masks the suffering of animals that are 
 
89 Directive 2008/120/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs [2008] OJ L47, Art. 3. 
90 Animal Welfare Ordinance 455.1 2008 (Switzerland), Art. 48. 
91 Directive 2008/119/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves [2008] OJ L10, Art. 3. 
92 ‘What is veal?’, RSPCA Australia, 23 Sept. 2019, available at: http://kb.rspca.org.au/What-is-veal_273.html. 
93 R. Smith, ‘Veal group housing approved’ (2007) 79(32) Feedstuffs, available at: 
https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=ustrath&id=GALE|A169023539&v=2.1&it=r&sid=AONE&asid=a69
b9b39; and American Veal Association, ‘AVA Confirms “Mission Accomplished”’ (2018), available at: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56b1263940261d30708d14b4/t/5a53ac7e53450a19f3a2fefb/15154330868
10/AVA+Group+Housing+Mission+Accomplished+2018+.pdf. 
94 Irish Farmers Association, ‘EU Trade Commissioner is Undermining EU Policies on Climate Change and 




reared in crates. On the basis of the available data, it is impossible to distinguish veal from beef 
or high welfare from low welfare meat. This frustrates research efforts aimed at exposing the 
extent of animal suffering in veal farming. 
 
Discussion of Existing Trade Flows 
EU imports of eggs, pork and beef and veal account for a small proportion of total EU 
consumption, but they are not insignificant. The continuation of import practices would show 
a negative impact of the prioritization of trade objectives over animal welfare because it permits 
low welfare animal products onto the EU market. However, one can only reach this conclusion 
speculatively because of the lack of trade data regarding method of production. This severely 
restricts the ability of researchers to quantify the impact of trade on animal welfare and, thus, 
recommend and work towards improvements. If we are to assume at least some low welfare 
animal products are imported into the EU, an absence of mandatory labelling would mean that 
concerned consumers cannot counteract this negative impact of EU trade policy by choosing 
high welfare products. Therefore, the potential welfare gains for animals offered by the relevant 
legislation are at risk of being diluted. 
 
3.4  The Second Component: Low Animal Welfare Havens 
 
Laying Hen Battery Cage Ban 
Production costs for enriched cage eggs in compliance with EU law are estimated to be 7% 
higher than for conventional battery-caged eggs.95 Anticipating this, academics communicated 
concerns about low animal welfare havens arising due to the ban.96 The trade figures 
 
95 P.L.M. van Horne, ‘Competitiveness of the EU egg sector; International comparison base year 2013’, LEI 
Wageningen UR, 2014, available at: https://www.wur.nl/upload_mm/6/5/f/8f9e79f4-9f56-4149-ab6a-
f9f718d8e934_2014-041%20vHorne_web.pdf, p. 20. 
96 Grethe, n. 81 above. 
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demonstrate a slight stagnation in growth of EU egg production following the ban, which was 
set off by a compensatory rise in imports. However, both developments were modest in scope 
and temporary. 
EU egg production has been growing consistently.  Some stagnation occurred in 2012, 
the first year of implementation of the battery cage ban,97 but production rates continued their 
long-term growth trajectory thereafter and amounted to 7.7 million tonnes in 2016.98 Prior to 
the ban, EU imports had dropped from 6,864kg of eggs in 2010 to only 3,792kg in 2011. This 
number increased dramatically to 7,210kg in 2012, the first year in which the ban was 
implemented. However, this stabilized quickly, dropping to 3,203kg in 2013. 
These figures do not clearly support the assumption that the EU ban resulted in the 
development of animal welfare havens. However, a number of factors may have contributed to 
an overall drop in imports.99 Further, the total import statistics mask particularities that could 
be suggestive of the existence of low animal welfare havens. 
For example, the EU authorized Ukraine to begin exporting eggs to the EU after the 
ban’s implementation. Ukraine can export eggs to the EU tariff free under two generous quotas 
granted following the ban’s enforcement.100 This is not conditional upon the eggs meeting EU 
welfare standards and all Ukrainian laying hens are caged.101 
Controversially, Dutch companies and the Dutch government also began investing in 
the large-scale poultry company in Ukraine called Myronivsky Hilboproduct (MHP).102 It is 
 
97 H. Windhorst, ‘The EU egg industry’, Zootecnica International, 25 May 2017, available at: 
http://zootecnicainternational.com/focus-on/eu-egg-industry/. 
98 Data available at: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/eggs/presentations_en.  
99 These factors include demand, price fluctuation of end product and animal feed (etc), and the impact of animal 
health and disease outbreaks. Also, compliance costs including environmental regulations and animal health rules 
and offsetting by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
100 Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2077 opening and providing for the administration of Union import tariff 
quotas for eggs, egg products and albumins originating in Ukraine [2015] OJ L302/57, annex I. 
101 N. Morton, ‘Global Poultry Trends: Russia and Ukraine Produce One in Three of Europe’s Eggs’, The Poultry 
Site, 3 Apr. 2013, available at: https://thepoultrysite.com/articles/global-poultry-trends-russia-and-ukraine-
produce-one-in-three-of-europes-eggs. 
102 T. Steinweg, ‘Chicken Run: The business strategies and impacts of poultry producer MHP in Ukraine’, SOMO, 
Sept. 2015, pp. 5, 12, & 21-2. 
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contrary to the spirit of the ban on battery cages that an EU member state benefits financially 
from battery farming outside of the EU, especially when those products are exported to the EU. 
Ukraine only began exporting eggs to the EU in 2014, but it is now the second biggest 
exporter of eggs to the EU. While Ukraine exported a modest 36 tonnes of eggs to the EU in 
2014, these exports have increased to 2,125 tonnes in 2016 and they continue to rise.103 EU 
trade policy further exposes its consumers to low welfare Ukrainian eggs.  
In other cases, the EU has acted more conscientiously regarding low-welfare egg 
imports. For example, the EU proposed to grant the US favourable trade terms in TTIP only 
for those eggs that met European welfare standards and the EU has reportedly imposed the 
same condition on imports of eggs in an agreement with the MERCOSUR countries.104 
 
Sow Stall Ban 
The EU sources most of its imported pork from Switzerland where pig welfare standards 
provide better legal protection than in the EU. Thus, low animal welfare havens have been 
avoided in this case because the EU has a reliable flow of group-housed pork from Switzerland. 
If the EU further liberalizes trade in pork with other countries, this situation could change. 
 
Veal Crate Ban 
Noting the combined category of beef and veal, it is impossible to closely scrutinize veal trade. 
Following implementation of the veal crate ban, production of beef and veal fell in the EU to 
a low of 7.2 million in 2013. However, imports of beef and veal also fell in the first year 
 
103 V. Vorotnikov, ‘MHP drives up Ukraine poultry exports to EU’, Global Meat News, 28 Sept. 2018, available 
at: https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2018/09/28/Ukraine-poultry-exports-rise#.W64CtI-OaVc.twitter. 
104 Eurogroup for Animals, ‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: What’s in it for Animals’, 2016, 
available at: http://www.eurogroupforanimals.org/wp-content/uploads/TTIP-Report-External.pdf, p. 14; and M. 





following implementation from 376,885 tonnes in 2006 to 305,840 tonnes in 2007 and to 
191,910 tonnes in 2008. 
 The top exporters of beef and veal to the EU are Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, 
the US, Namibia, Botswana, New Zealand and Paraguay. Despite the inadequate data available, 
the fall in imports to the EU of beef and veal suggests that no animal welfare haven has arisen 
in this case. However, the EU’s bilateral trade negotiations with the MERCOSUR countries 
creates a risk of increased low welfare imports.105 
 
Discussion of Low Animal Welfare Havens 
The data presented here fails to demonstrate a mass shift of production to non-EU countries 
following enactment of the bans discussed. However, while low animal welfare havens are not 
a widespread problem, the case of Ukrainian egg production indicates that low animal welfare 
havens can arise in the existing regulatory environment. The available trade data, which does 
not specify method of production, does not make this immediately clear.  
It is fortunate that the EU has a reliable supply of high welfare Swiss pork at present. 
However, the EU’s ambitious bilateral trade policy puts this situation at risk. The EU routinely 
offers sizeable pork tariffs in trade negotiations.106 This may lead to new or enhanced export 
markets to the EU in pork reared through intensive confinement.  
Sophisticated economic modelling would be required to analyse all the forces acting 
upon the trade in animal products in order to determine why low animal welfare havens have 
not yet arisen. This is neither possible nor necessary here. The fundamental conclusion to be 
drawn here regards the way in which the available data masks animal harm and the dangers 
 
105  EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, agreement in principle, Brussels (Belgium), 1 Jul. 2019, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157964.pdf. 
106 E.g. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the Other Part [2017] OJ L 11/23, p. 237; and New EU-Mexico Agreement, 
agreement in principle, Brussels (Belgium), 23 Apr. 2018, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1833, p. 2. 
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posed by EU trade policy to animals, making precise analyses of trade impact impossible. This 
is true of the data for egg and veal trade.  
Tariff classification systems, relied upon to categorize trade data, are very precise.107 
They divide animal products according to weight, bone content, temperature (chilled, frozen, 
etc), and so on. And yet, these classifications ignore method of production and welfare 
considerations. This makes it impossible for researchers to observe the rate of low welfare 
imports and the occurrence of low animal welfare havens. In turn, this hinders the development 
of research aimed at improving the negative impact of animal welfare on trade. 
On the basis of this conclusion, it is hoped that this initial investigation will inspire 
further research into the relevant trade data in order to predict how and when low animal 
welfare havens may arise. 
 
3.5 The Third Component: Chilling Effect 
 
The Impact of Trade in the WTO’s Formative Years 
The establishment of the WTO in 1995 caused concerns in the animal welfare community that 
it would ‘inhibit the development of animal welfare protection legislation’.108 Indeed, a chilling 
effect can be observed on the use of trade policy to protect animal welfare by the EU. EU trade 
measures that were drafted around this time and that directly addressed animal welfare were 
subject to renegotiation, delay, and limitation. Three examples in this regard are the 1999 
Laying Hens Directive, the 1991 Leghold Traps Regulation, and the 2009 Cosmetics 
Regulation. 
 
107 The Harmonized System, a tariff classification nomenclature developed by the World Customs Organization, 
available at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx. 
108 Harrop and Bowles, n. 35 above, p. 64; and Fisher, n. 4 above. 
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The 1999 Laying Hens Directive bans the use of battery cages for laying hens in the 
EU without restricting imports.109 The EU knew this would competitively disadvantage its 
producers.110 At EU parliamentary questions, the Commission gave no clear indication as to 
how it would handle the threat of cheap, unregulated imports.111 
The 1991 Leghold Traps Regulation bans the use of cruel leghold traps within the EU 
and the importation of particular furs, unless the exporting state regulates trapping methods to 
meet internationally agreed ‘humane trapping standards’.112 Leghold traps capture animals 
with a steel jaw that does not kill the animal but restrains them, causing severe injury and 
distress. 
 The import restriction has had little practical effect. Enforcement of the regulation was 
delayed and weakened. The US and Canada threatened to challenge the regulation under the 
WTO rules.113 In response, the European Commission postponed the start date of the ban from 
1 January 1995 to 1 January 1996.114 It proposed another year long delay.115 This was 
apparently due to ‘doubts as to the legality of the ban’.116 The ban went into effect on 1 January 
1996 but the Commission blocked implementation by ‘asking customs authorities not to 
 
109 Laying Hens Directive, n. 88 above. 
110 Harrop and Bowles, n. 35 above, p. 80. 
111 European Commission, ‘Answer to written question E-0546/2000 by William Newton Dunn (ELDR) to the 
Commission on Welfare of laying hens’, 12 May 2000, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2000-0546&language=EN. 
112 Regulation 3254/91 prohibiting the use of leghold traps and the introduction into the Community of pelts and 
manufactured goods of certain wild animal species originating in countries which catch them by means of leghold 
traps or trapping methods which do not meet international humane trapping standards [1991] OJ L308/34, Arts. 
2 & 3.1. 
113 A. Nollkaemper, ‘The Legality of Moral Crusades Disguised in Trade Laws: an Analysis of the EC ‘Ban’ on 
Furs from Animals Taken by Leghold Traps’ (1996) 8(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 237-56, at 238. 
114 Regulation 1771/94 laying down new provisions on the introduction into the Community of pelts and 
manufactured goods of certain wild animal species [1994] OJ L184/3. 
115 Commission Proposal COM/1995/737 for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3254/91 prohibiting the use of leghold traps in the Community and the introduction into the Community of pelts 
and manufactured goods of certain wild animal species originating in countries which catch them by means of 
leghold traps or trapping methods which do not meet international humane trapping standards [1995] OJ C58/17, 
Art. 4(1)-(2). 
116 Nollkaemper, n. 124 above, p. 243. 
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implement it’.117 The Commission counterintuitively described implementation of the ban by 
member states as illegal.118 
 Further, the EU failed to apply the fur import ban to the US, Canada, and Russia (the 
main fur exporting countries) for many species.119 A tripartite agreement was negotiated 
instead which did ‘little to discourage the use of leghold traps’.120 
The 1976 Cosmetics Directive (now re-implemented as the 2009 Cosmetics 
Regulation) bans the performance of animal testing for cosmetic products and ingredients in 
the EU or the placing on the market of such products (including imports).121 
 Enforcement was postponed multiple times from 1 January 1998 to 11 September 2004, 
11 March 2009 and 11 March 2013 for different parts of the regulation.122 The proposal for the 
second postponement notes doubts regarding the WTO legality of the measure.123 This reveals 
that the EU’s reservations regarding the WTO rules impacted the decision to delay 
implementation. The literature is critical of the Commission’s ‘cautious analysis’ of the WTO 
rules.124 
 The EU was aware of the potential for diverging animal welfare standards to negatively 
impact high welfare producers in the EU. This was recognized in the preamble and Article 8 
to the 1998 Farming Directive.125 However, the three examples discussed in this section 




119 Commission Decision of 14 October 1998 amending Council Decision 97/602/EC concerning the list referred 
to in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 3254/91 and in Article 1(1)(a) of 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 35/97 [1998] OJ L 286/56. 
120 Nollkaemper, n. 124 above, p. 243. 
121 Regulation 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic products [2009] OJ L342/52, 
Art 18(1)(a)-(d). 
122 Commission Proposal COM/2000/0189 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending for the seventh time Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to cosmetic products [1976] OJ C 311/E/134, para. 1.2. 
123 Ibid. 
124 G. de Búrca & J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing, 2001), 
p. 8. 
125 Directive 98/58/EC concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes [1998] OJ L221/23, 
preamble & Art. 8. 
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environmental objectives and the potential for costly challenge under the WTO’s new dispute 
settlement mechanism were strong enough to override concerns for the competitiveness of 
producers in the EU. 
 
The Impact of Trade in the Early 2000s 
The chilling effect surrounding the WTO’s establishment has persisted. This fact has been 
largely ignored by those commentators who were critical of the WTO’s impact around the time 
of its establishment.  
Most EU animal welfare legislation enacted following the WTO’s establishment does 
not contain trade restrictions.126 For example, when proposing higher welfare standards for 
broiler chickens, the European Parliament proposed to regulate and prohibit imports that did 
not comply.127 However, the final version of the measure contains no such import ban.128  There 
are exceptions where the EU restricts trade to pursue conservation and animal health 
objectives.129 Also, in two cases (cat and dog fur, and seal products), the EU enacted trade 
restrictions to protect animal welfare.130 
 However, the EU displays an overall hesitance. This may have been caused, in part, by 
the EU’s failed attempt to initiate a multilateral dialogue on animal welfare and trade through 
a proposal to the WTO.131 WTO members were not enthused, arguing that this was an issue for 
 
126 I. Offor, ‘The Chilling Effect of the World Trade Organisation on European Union Animal Welfare Protection’ 
(LLM Thesis, The University of Aberdeen, April 2017), pp. 76 & 89. 
127 European Parliament legislative resolution COM 2005/0221 on the proposal for a Council directive laying 
down minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production [2005] OJ C290E/86, amendment 
8. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Offor, n. 137 above, p. 89. 
130 Cat and Dog Fur Regulation n. 77 above; Seals Regulation n. 66 above. 
131 WTO Committee on Agriculture, n. 76 above. 
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the OIE.132 As a result, the EU shifted its focus to including animal welfare in its bilateral trade 
policy.133 
 The cat and dog fur import ban and the seal product import ban do not strike at the most 
pressing animal welfare issues impacted upon by trade. Intensive livestock farming for meat 
and dairy production causes more significant and long-lasting harm to welfare than the killing 
of wild seals for fur.134 Further, the cat and dog fur import ban justifies its limited scope by 
reference to societal preferences regarding animal husbandry.135 This choice has nothing to do 
with welfare science. 
 The EU deals with animal welfare inconsistently in its trade policy. However, such 
inconsistency has been found to be compliant with the WTO rules.136 This is because requiring 
moral consistency would paralyze states, making animal welfare regulation impossible until 
they could regulate ‘every aspect of animal welfare to an equally high standard’ in a ‘perfectly 
simultaneous and consistent fashion’.137 Thus, regulating animal welfare for public moral 
reasons in an inconsistent fashion may not be disingenuous per se. 
 Nonetheless, the EU’s inconsistency has been regarded as extreme caution in the face 
of uncertainty regarding WTO law.138 Peter Stevenson, Chief Policy Adviser at Compassion in 
World Farming, notes that EU officials often cite incompatibility with WTO rules as the reason 
for failing to take policy actions on animal welfare.139 Further, the EU’s willingness to tackle 
 
132 A. Swinbank, ‘Like Products, Animal Welfare and the World Trade Organization’ (2006) 40(4) Journal of 
World Trade, pp. 687-711, at 690; A.L. Hobbs et al, ‘Ethics, domestic food policy and trade law: assessing the 
EU animal welfare proposal to the WTO’ (2002) 27(5) Food Policy, pp. 437-54, at 440. 
133 Commission, Animal Welfare Strategy n. 78 above, p. 10. 
134 Harrison, n. 9 above. 
135 Cat and Dog Fur Regulation, n. 77 above, preamble recital 1. 
136 EC – Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, n. 68 above, paras. 5.199-201. 
137 R. Howse, J. Langille & K. Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO after 
Seal Products’ (2015-2016) 48(1) The George Washington International Law Review, pp. 81-150, at 114-5. 
138 K. Cook & D. Bowles, ‘Growing Pains: The Developing Relationship of Animal Welfare Standards and the 
World Trade Rules’ (2010) 19(2) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, pp. 227-
38, at 228; S. Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’ 
(2002) 27(1) Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 59-110, at 76-80; and Fitzgerald, ‘Morality may not be 
Enough’, n. 74 above, p. 102. 
139 Stevenson, n. 82 above, p. 1. 
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some animal welfare issues more strongly than others may reveal other motivating factors such 
as a desire to satisfy moral appetite for animal welfare without negatively impacting European 
farmers. The EU’s response to the legal certainty provided by EC – Seal Products is revealing 
in that respect. 
 
The Impact of Trade after EC – Seal Products 
EC – Seal Products is a landmark case for animal welfare. It is the first case to rule that public 
moral concern for animal welfare is a legitimate justification for trade restrictions under WTO 
law.140 As such, EC – Seal Products provides a rebuttal of the EU’s caution regarding trade 
restrictions for animal welfare.141 Academics have noted that EC – Seal Products opens ‘the 
door to future animal welfare defenses’.142 
 However, the EU has failed to use this legal clarity to rectify the chilling effect on 
animal welfare legislation that followed the establishment of the WTO. The EU has not 
amended the measures that were scaled back and no new welfare-based trade restrictions have 
been proposed. 
Key officials have, at times, downplayed the significance of EC – Seal Products. In 
2015, in the context of a debate concerning trade restrictions of horse blood products to 
alleviate animal suffering, Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis stated that the ‘EU cannot 
impose its animal welfare standards on third countries due to very stringent requirements under 
WTO law’.143 His statement indicates a lack of understanding of the legal issues at hand. EC – 
Seal Products confirms that the EU can restrict trade to protect the public morality of its own 
citizens. It can use unilateral measures, such as the seals regime, to protect the welfare of 
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animals both domestically and abroad in the pursuit of this objective. This does not amount to 
the imposition of standards on third countries. Of course, one cannot assume the outcome of 
EC – Seal Products would be replicable in disputes regarding other animal products. However, 
the EU has shown no ambition to explore what the outcome of this case might mean for other 
trade restrictions aimed at protecting public morality related to animal welfare.  
A recent European Commission report on the impact of the EU’s animal welfare 
international activities on the competitiveness of European livestock production highlights the 
limited role the EU envisages for trade policy in tackling animal welfare goals. It also 
highlights a focus on bilateral trade policy as opposed to unilateral or multilateral 
mechanisms.144 The limited role for trade policy is further evidenced by the neglect of trade 
policy demonstrated in the early work of the EU’s new Animal Welfare Platform.145 The EU 
has, in fact, inspired some improvements to animal welfare regulation through its bilateral trade 
policy, such as with the EU-Chile Free Trade Agreement.146 However, the EU has 
demonstrated that it is not updating its policy regarding trade and animal welfare in the light 
of EC – Seal Products. 
 
Discussion of the Chilling Effect 
Trade, linked to the establishment of the WTO, has had a chilling effect on the EU’s animal 
welfare legislation. This impact has persisted despite the EC – Seal Products dispute which 
provided regulatory autonomy for WTO members to restrict trade in order to protect animal 
welfare. Thus, arguably the EU continues to prioritize trade over animal welfare objectives 
 
144 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
impact of animal welfare international activities on the competitiveness of European livestock producers in a 
globalized world’, COM(2018)42 final, 26 Jan. 2018, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0042, p. 4.  
145 Commission Decision establishing the Commission Expert Group “Platform on Animal Welfare” [2017] OJ C 
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without the excuse of WTO restrictions and without sustained attention and criticism in 
academic circles. 
 The sporadic nature of the EU’s legislation on animal welfare and trade could be 
attributed to the subjective nature of legislating on moral issues and the moral schizophrenia 
common in moral attitudes towards different species of animal.147 It could also point to a 
problematic balancing of political priorities and legal objectives. Indeed, the persistence of the 
chilling effect supports arguments that the WTO has been used as a scapegoat to mask low 
political will for strong animal welfare protection in the EU.148 
  
 
4. PATERNALISTIC TRADE LAW AND POLICY AS ILL-SUITED PRIMARY 
DRIVERS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR ANIMALS 
 
Attempted reconciliations of trade and animal welfare have had a limited impact on the lives 
and wellbeing of animals. While this partly owes to the chilling effect of the WTO, this policy 
failure has persisted despite the favourable ruling in EC – Seal Products. Thus, trade policy is 
a poor domain in which to pursue the legal protection of animals.  
Traditionally, animal law researchers were alert to the dangers posed to animals by 
trade policy, particularly the WTO.149 However, as the WTO has proven itself capable of 
incorporating animal interests into dispute settlement proceedings, researchers have grown 
complacent. Most commentators avoid dwelling on the fact that, despite the favourable ruling 
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set out in EC – Seal Products, trade policy continues to take precedence over animal 
protection.150 
EC – Seal Products has been hailed as a great success for animals.151 Thomas Kelch 
and Lurie and Kalinina have argued the case provides members with a solid footing on which 
to protect animal welfare.152 Charlotte Blattner, while noting the limitations of the WTO as a 
forum for animal protection, argues that the WTO has progressed the international conversation 
on animal welfare more than any ‘global animal treaty law’.153 Katie Sykes argues that 
developments in trade law have the ‘potential to materially improve the level of effective legal 
protection for animals around the world’.154 
These points are well made. For example, the present author shares Katie Sykes’ view 
that the WTO has become an important context for the development of animal protection 
norms.155 However, a strong critique ought to be launched against situating the development 
of animal norms within trade policy contexts so as to transcend the liberal conception of animal 
protection which goes no further than forbidding ‘unnecessary’ suffering. This liberal 
conception diverts attention from the harm that continues to be caused by animal trade. It is 
reasonable for animal welfare NGOs to seek to influence trade policy within the existing 
structures of EU policy as restricted by WTO law.156 However, the academic literature should 
provide more critical thought. While trade law and policy have been the primary drivers of a 
global discussion regarding animal welfare, they are inappropriate drivers for the following 
reasons.  
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Firstly, it is not positive for the long-term advancement of animal welfare that the WTO 
anchors animal protection to the fickle and geographically variable concept of public morality. 
Also, relying on dispute settlement for progress is problematic because it depends upon WTO 
members deciding which disputes to raise. Thus, EC – Seal Products could improve wild seal 
welfare but there is silence regarding trade that facilitates more long-lasting harms, such as 
unregulated imports of battery caged eggs. 
Secondly, regulating trade of animals and their products presupposes and reinforces a 
cultural understanding of animals as property.157 Trade policy fails to recognize the special 
status of animals afforded by other legal regimes. For example, the product classification 
systems relied upon by trade policy categorize animal products according to their use by 
humans.158 Trade in animals and animal products is also frequently measured by monetary 
value or by weight, not by headcount.159 These practices brutalize and objectify animals, 
encouraging a self-reinforcing culture of disregard for animal interests. Thus, trade law is more 
primitive than animal welfare laws which afford animals a sui generis legal status:160 they are 
owned like property but they are also afforded certain special protections.161 
Trade law and policy have disproportionately impacted the normative underpinnings of 
global governance for animals or “global animal law”. This is both due to the force of trade 
law and the absence of animal-centric global law. Global animal law is in very early 
development. Animal law has taken hold in most domestic jurisdictions.162 However, there is 
no international treaty on animal welfare and efforts to enact a Universal Declaration on 
Animal Welfare at the UN have not met with success.163 The closest thing to an animal law 
 
157 For consequences, see G.L. Francione, Animals, Property and the Law (Temple University Press, 1995). 
158 The Harmonized System, n. 117 above. 
159 Ibid. 
160 E.g. Animal Welfare Act 2006 c 45 (United Kingdom), s. 4. 
161 M. Bowman, P. Davies & C. Redgwell (eds), Lyster’s International Wildlife Law, 2nd edn. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 673-6. 
162 Ibid. 
163 For support, though nothing has been enacted or seriously contemplated at the UN, see M. Gibson, ‘The 
Universal Declaration of Animal Welfare’ (2011) 16(2) Deakin Law Review, pp. 539-67. 
32 
 
treaty is soft law in the form of non-binding animal welfare standards in the World 
Organization for Animal Health’s terrestrial animal health code.164 
Despite its underdevelopment, global animal law is emerging, at least as an academic 
discourse. There is now a global animal law section at the Max Planck Institute,165 a Global 
Animal Law Project,166 two published symposiums on global animal law,167 and a conference 
series.168 This academic discourse must build its own voice and worldview, distinct from the 
trade linkage debate. Otherwise, the pre-eminence of trade law is likely to result in a balancing 
of interests that weighs in favour of a liberal conception of free trade. 
WTO law has attained a degree of legal enforceability that is unmatched by most other 
issues of global governance.169 Thus, it is not negative, per se, that animal welfare should find 
a place within the WTO.170 However, it is detrimental that the most influential pronouncements 
on animal welfare at the global level have emanated from trade officials using trade-centric 
language in pursuit of economic objectives. There is no expertise on issues of animal welfare 
at the WTO.171 Thus, the WTO legal structure should be rejected as the absolute limit and 
framework for research on trade and animal welfare.172 Instead, the WTO system should be 
examined for ‘evidence of its larger effects’ in order to inspire reform.173 This requires 
transplanting trade and animal welfare research into the global animal law academic space.  
The pre-eminence of trade law and the linkage debate partly explains why empirical 
research on the impacts of trade on animals has not been forthcoming. Growing complacency 
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amongst animal liberators regarding trade law has slowed the output of critical research. 
Further, the pre-eminence of trade policy and its negligible treatment of animal welfare has 
made empirical research on trade and animal welfare particularly difficult. Thus, future 
research on trade and animal welfare ought to be conducted within a research tradition separate 
from the linkage debate.  
Situating such research within the global animal law discourse permits critical 
commentary on the treatment of animals as property and of the WTO as a governor of animal 
interests. It allows for a more animal-centric perspective. This perspective leads to a critical 
conception of free trade – a conception which includes trade impact concerns – and the 




The precise, empirical impact of European trade policy on animal welfare protection remains 
elusive. Imports of animal products clearly continue and they are not conditioned on meeting 
EU welfare standards. Trade data hides whether these imports include low welfare products, 
though it seems very likely. Investigating low animal welfare havens raises the same issues, 
creating a vulnerability of over-reliance on particular cases, such as Ukrainian egg exports. 
This case provides potential evidence of a negative impact of trade and clear evidence of a 
prioritization of trade policy over animal welfare objectives. With regard to the chilling effect, 
WTO-wariness clearly persists amongst key officials within the European Commission and the 
resulting impact on regulation is observable. This conclusion paves the way for further research 
into policymaking at the European institutions regarding trade and animal welfare. 
 The conclusions of this article make the case for further critical research into the 
empirical impact of trade on animal welfare. Clearly trade policy is prioritized over animal 
34 
 
welfare. However, quantifying impact is made impossible by the ignorance to animal harm 
displayed by the trade sphere. This leads to the conclusion that research on the trade and animal 
welfare interface alternatively must be situated amongst emerging research on global animal 
law. 
The conception of free trade adopted by the linkage debate, which reinforces unhelpful 
dichotomies, is obstructive to progress toward better treatment of animals. Trade law is 
restricted because animals’ property status is deep-rooted within its infrastructure.  Conversely, 
global animal law could centre upon animal interests and so has the potential to elevate beyond 
viewing animals’ property status as an inevitability. 
To conclude, if animals are to be protected effectively, we must begin debating the 
trade and animal welfare interface within the context of global animal law, maintaining a 
radical openness of mind at every step. 
